Competition, Privacy, and Big Data by Besen, Stanley M.
Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 28 
Issue 2 Spring 2020 Article 4 
2020 
Competition, Privacy, and Big Data 
Stanley M. Besen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, 
and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stanley M. Besen, Competition, Privacy, and Big Data, 28 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech 63 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol28/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
 
63 
COMPETITION, PRIVACY, AND BIG DATA 
Stanley M. Besen 
I. The Value of Consumer Data ........................................................................65 
II. The Data/Competition Nexus ......................................................................68 
III. Promoting Competition as the Sole Policy Objective ................................69 
IV. Should Data Sharing Be Made Compulsory? .............................................77 
V. Promoting Privacy as the Sole Policy Objective .........................................80 
VI. Classifying Data .........................................................................................84 
VII. Can Competition and Privacy Concerns be Reconciled? ..........................86 
VIII. Does the PSD2 Approach Have Wider Applicability? ............................87 
IX. Conclusion ..................................................................................................88 
 
“We don’t have better algorithms … we just have more data.”1 
“Big data now represents a core economic asset that can create significant 
competitive advantages for firms and drive innovation and growth.”2 
“Absent specific legal guidance, organizations—and people, in general—tend 
to act in their own best interests. The resulting behavior is destructive to 
individual privacy because it is driven by the never-ending pursuit of improved 
products and services in the context of competition.”3 
“Sharing people’s data with potentially hundreds of companies, without 
properly assessing and addressing the risk of these counterparties, raises 
questions around the security and retention of this data.”4 
                                                          
 Senior Consultant, Charles River Associates. The views expressed in this article are the 
author’s own. Steven VanOmmeren provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 
 1 Scott Cleland, Google’s “Infringenovation” Secrets, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2011), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/2011/10/03/googles-infringenovation-
secrets/#5df7725130a6 (quoting Google’s Chief Scientist Peter Norvig). 
 2 OECD, Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation 319 
(2013). 
 3 Eric Santanen, The Value of Protecting Privacy, 62 BUS. HORIZONS 5, 9 (2019). 
 4 Simon McDougall, ICO Adtech Update Report Published Following Industry 
Engagement, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF. (June 20, 2019), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-
ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/06/blog-ico-adtech-update-report-published-
following-industry-engagement/. 
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If, as the Google executive quoted above contends, having access to larger 
amounts of data than its rivals can enhance the competitive position of a firm, 
what should the public policy be toward the use by a firm of the data that it 
collects about its users? This question, which implicates issues of both privacy 
and competition, is the subject of this article. Specifically, the article is 
concerned with the control of data about the activities of large numbers of 
individuals by a single firm and the incentives, or lack thereof, of that firm to 
share those data with its rivals.5 
There are many possible meanings of the term “privacy.” For example, as 
Adam Cohen has observed, “People do a lot of things online that they may want 
to keep secret – for example, looking up symptoms of diseases (which health 
insurance companies may consider in writing coverage) and visiting non-
mainstream political sites (which the government might want to know about).”6 
Alternatively, Richard Posner considers privacy to involve “withholding 
information primarily in personal rather than business contexts.”7 However, 
neither of these aspects of privacy are the subject of this article. Instead, the 
focus is on whether to place limitations on access to information about the 
behavior of an individual that has economic value to the entity that possesses it, 
for example information about the individual’s internet searches and purchases. 
Moreover, this article does not address privacy issues that arise when, for 
example, data about individuals are collected and used by government agencies 
to improve the quality of public services or by non-profit institutions in 
connection with their offerings. Finally, whereas the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (“NIST”) distinguishes between privacy risks related 
to cybersecurity (examples of which are “data theft by external attackers or the 
unauthorized access or use of data by employees”) and “potential problems 
individuals could experience from system, product, or service operations with 
data” that are “unrelated to cybersecurity incidents,” this article is concerned 
only with the latter types of privacy risks.8 
                                                          
 5 JOSHUA GANS, ENHANCING COMPETITION WITH DATA AND IDENTITY PORTABILITY 1, 7, 
13 (2018) addresses the control of communications between individuals whether they use 
the same or different platforms. In order to promote competition between platforms, Gans 
has proposed what he calls identity portability under which “if users of a particular platform 
give permission to send messages to person A, then, should person A change digital 
platforms, she can have all messages forwarded to her on the new network.” Under this 
proposal, not only would user A be able to port her own data to the new platform, she would 
also continue to receive the messages from others that she would have received had she not 
changed platforms. 
 6 Adam Cohen, Will We Ever Get Strong Internet Privacy Rules?, TIME (Mar. 5, 2012), 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/03/05/will-we-ever-get-strong-internet-privacy-rules/. 
 7 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978). 
 8 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST PRIVACY 
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Finally, just as there are several dimensions of privacy, there are a number of 
different types of data. In this regard, the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party of the European Commission makes the important distinction among 
“[d]ata (that are) actively and knowingly provided by the data subject,”9 
“[o]bserved data provided by the data subject by virtue of the use of the service 
or the device,”10 and “inferred data and derived data … created by the data 
controller on the basis of the data ‘provided by the data subject.’ “11 This article 
considers only the two categories of “provided” data. 
I. THE VALUE OF CONSUMER DATA 
As Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman have observed, 
[T]he Internet has evolved from an architecture of decentralized and 
possibly anonymous interactions … to one where packets of data 
capturing all types of behaviors … are uniquely … and sometimes 
personally identified … chronicles of peoples’ actions, desires, 
interests, and mere intentions are collected by third parties, often 
without individuals’ knowledge or explicit consent.… Such vast 
amounts of collected data have obvious and substantial economic 
value. Individuals’ traits and attributes … but also her clickthroughs, 
comments posted online, [and] photos uploaded to social media … 
are increasingly regarded as business assets that can be used to target 
services or offers, provide relevant advertising, or be traded with 
other parties.12 
Similarly, Unlocking Digital Competition, the Report of the Digital Competition 
Expert Panel, commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary 
of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy of the United Kingdom, 
notes that “detailed knowledge about consumers’ behaviour or purchasing 
intentions, in some cases held in near-real time, can be valuable. This data makes 
targeted advertising possible, for example to be deployed when a consumer is 
                                                          
FRAMEWORK: A TOOL FOR IMPROVING PRIVACY THROUGH ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 1, 
3 (2020), https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2020/01/16/NIST%20Privacy%20 
Framework_V1.0.pdf. 
 9 Data Working Party Directive 95/46, art. 29, 2016 O.J. 1, 10 (EC). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 
442, 444 (2016); Daisuke Wakabayashi & Karen Weise, Attention, Amazon Shoppers: 
Google Wants Some of Your Spending Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/technology/google-shopping-amazon-rivalry.html 
(reporting that Amazon has … quietly been building tools to help brands show video and 
display ads to consumers on other websites based on the rich data they have on their 
customers. For example, someone using a credit card from one bank to pay for Amazon 
purchases may see ads for another bank’s cards when reading the news online). 
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considering making a purchase. It also allows services to be tailored towards 
groups or individuals.”13 
Because access to large amounts of information about consumers has 
economic value, it is unsurprising that firms undertake substantial efforts to 
increase the amount of such information that they accumulate. Argenton and 
Prüfer have observed that “[a]ccess to more search log data today leads to higher 
perceived search quality. Higher perceived search quality leads to more demand 
for searches tomorrow, which in turn creates even more search log data 
tomorrow than today.”14 Crémer, de Montjoye, and Schweitzer (“Crémer et al”) 
note that “having accumulated large amounts of relevant data over a long period 
of time often provides a strong competitive advantage to incumbents.”15 
Martens, de Fortuny, and Provost “empirically demonstrate that when predictive 
                                                          
 13 DIG. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 23 (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf; Jon Lafayette, Data 
Shows Digital Video Is Tougher Rival for TV, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.multichannel.com/news/data-shows-digital-video-is-tougher-rival-for-tv 
(explaining that Walmart Media Group general manager Stefanie Joy has stated, “We invite 
you to leverage our first-part shopper data by delivering highly relevant and accountable 
advertising,” and Kristi Argyilan, president of Roundel, Target’s in-house advertising 
agency and media network, has stated that Roundel will use data that it gathers from 
Target’s customers to send “the right ad to the right people at the right time on the right 
channels, whether that be on our Target platforms or off platform with other publishers”). 
 14 Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition with Network 
Externalities, 8 J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 73, 74–75 (2012). 
 15 JACQUES CRÉMER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL 
ERA 33 (2019) (according to the authors, the types of data that have value include both 
individual-level data and anonymous access to a large amount of individual level data); 
Contra, ANJA LAMBRECHT & CATHERINE E. TUCKER, CAN BIG DATA PROTECT A FIRM FROM 
COMPETITION? 9–10 (2015), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/CPI-Lambrecht-Tucker.pdf (“The skill in making big data valuable 
is being able to move from mere observational correlations to correctly identifying, 
potentially outside of big data, what correlations should form the basis for strategic action . . 
. successful companies have developed the ability to design, implement, and evaluate and 
then act upon meaningful field experiments. It is this ‘test and learn’ environment, coupled 
with the skill to take action on the insights, which can make big data valuable.” A possible 
reconciliation of this observation with that of the Google executive who claimed that 
Google’s advantage stems from having more data rather than having better algorithms is 
that many firms may have the ability to make effective use of the data that they possess but 
that their ability to do so is, nonetheless, constrained by the amount that they possess.); Hal 
R. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics, 28 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2014) 
(“[L]arge datasets may allow for more flexible relationships than simple linear models.”); 
Hal R. Varian, Lecture at the 2007 Angelo Costa Lecture in Rome, The Economics of 
Internet Search (Nov. 2006) (“Since the probability of purchase is low, even when ads are 
relevant, one has to reach a large audience to have any hope of selling a product. Hence new 
search engines who hope to become economically successful have to pay large fixed costs to 
build the scale necessary to serve enough ads to cover those entry costs.”). 
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models are built from sparse, fine-grained data … we continue to see marginal 
increases in predictive performance even to very large scale.… This implies that 
institutions with large data sets—plus the skill to take advantage of them—
potentially can obtain substantial competitive advantage over institutions 
without such access or skill.”16 The Competition Committee of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Directorate for 
Financial and Enterprise Affairs has argued that: 
[A] company with a large base of users is able to collect more data 
to improve the quality of the service (for instance, by creating better 
algorithms) and, this way, to acquire new users – “user feedback 
loop.” On the other hand, companies are able to explore user data to 
improve ad targeting and monetise their services, obtaining 
additional funds to invest in the quality of the service and attracting 
again more users – “monetisation feedback loop.” These 
interminable loops can make it very difficult for any entrant to 
compete against an incumbent with a large base of customers.17 
Finally, Rubinfeld and Gal note that: 
If the benefits that individuals receive are positively related to the 
number of other individuals that utilize or consume a product, the 
resulting barrier will have an effect that is similar in its impact to a 
more traditional supply-side barrier. Substantial (sunk) expenditures 
will be required to counter or even overcome existing network 
effects. This may happen when the quality of the product depends on 
the quality of the data, which, in turn, is affected by the number of 
data entries, their variety, and their freshness. This is because such 
data accelerate automated learning. Entry of new firms that do not 
have such data might be quite difficult.18 
                                                          
 16 Enric Junqué de Fortuny et al., Predictive Modeling with Big Data: Is Bigger Really 
Better?, 1 BIG DATA 215, 215 (2013); DIG. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING 
DIGITAL COMPETITION 34 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furma
n_review_web.pdf (“[T]he available evidence on this subject is somewhat mixed. Some 
studies have found that larger datasets can be valuable assets for predictive analysis, despite 
ultimately reaching a point at which the returns from data collection start to diminish. 
Others, such as analysis of Netflix, suggest that in some markets the returns to scale for data 
may be rapidly diminishing.”). 
 17 ANIA THIEMANN & PEDRO GONZAGA, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., BIG 
DATA: BRINGING COMPETITION POLICY TO THE DIGITAL ERA 10 (2016), https://one.oecd.org/ 
document/DAF/COMP(2016)14/en/pdf. 
 18 Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 
339, 355 (2017). 
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II. THE DATA/COMPETITION NEXUS 
The view that having access to more consumer data can enhance a firm’s 
competitive position was embraced by the Antitrust Division of the United 
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) when it approved an advertising 
agreement between Microsoft and Yahoo.19  Specifically, the division stated 
that: 
The transaction will enhance Microsoft’s competitive performance 
because it will have access to a larger set of queries, which should 
accelerate the automated learning of Microsoft’s search and paid 
search algorithms and enhance Microsoft’s ability to serve more 
relevant search results and paid search listings, particularly with 
respect to rare or “tail” queries. The increased queries received by 
the combined operation will further provide Microsoft with a much 
larger pool of data than it currently has or is likely to obtain without 
this transaction. This larger data pool may enable more effective 
testing and thus more rapid innovation of potential new search-
related products, changes in the presentation of search results and 
paid search listings, other changes in the user interface, and changes 
in the search or paid search algorithms.20 
Despite the view that a firm’s ability to compete may be enhanced if it can 
combine data from different sources, at least one competition authority has 
placed limits on such behavior. In a recent decision, Germany’s Federal Cartel 
Office held that individual services owned by Facebook, such as WhatsApp and 
Instagram, could continue to collect user data, but that Facebook must have 
                                                          
 19 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid Search 
Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. (Feb. 18, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-antitrust-division-its-decision-
close-its-investigation-internet. 
 20 Id.; Microsoft & Yahoo Search Deal, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, 
https://searchengineland.com/library/features/microsoft-yahoo-merger# (last visited Apr. 10, 
2020); Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, No Mistake About It: The Important Role of 
Antitrust in the Era of Big Data, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, April 2015, at 1, 3; Daniel Sokol 
& Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 
1146 (2016) (showing that both report cases in which companies raised the prospect of 
“data-driven efficiencies” during merger investigations, which, if the efficiency claims are 
to be credited, means that the parties claimed that the efficiencies were “merger specific,” 
i.e., that they could not be achieved in other ways); Andres V. Lerner, The Role of “Big 
Data” In Online Platform Competition, SSRN, Aug. 2014, at 1, 26 (presenting a number of 
examples where “providers . . . forge partnerships in order to offer valuable content based 
on data collected by other firms,” and instances in which companies share their data with 
others; however, it cannot be assumed that they will always do so, and where control of the 
data provides a competitive advantage, a better assumption is that they will not). 
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users’ voluntary consent before assigning the collected data to Facebook user 
accounts.21 When Facebook does not have consent, the data must remain with 
the respective service that collected it and cannot be processed in combination 
with Facebook data.22 Thus, under the terms of this decision, the various 
Facebook services would be operated as separate entities.23 The 
Bundeskartellamt also held that “collecting data from third party websites and 
assigning them to a Facebook user account will also only be possible if users 
give their voluntary consent.”24 In explaining the rationale for the decision, 
Andreas Mundt, President of Bundeskartellamt, emphasized how Facebook’s 
ability to combine data about a given individual from a number of different 
sources helped the company gain market power.25 Thus, the decision was 
apparently motivated by competition rather than by privacy concerns.26 
More recently, the European Commission opened an investigation into the 
use by Amazon of data from independent retailers that sell on its marketplace.27 
Based on its investigation, the Commission concluded that Amazon appears to 
use “competitively sensitive information – about marketplace sellers, their 
products and transactions on the marketplace” and that, if proven, this may 
violate “EU competition rules on anticompetitive agreements between 
companies … and/or on the abuse of a dominant position….”28 
III. PROMOTING COMPETITION AS THE SOLE POLICY OBJECTIVE 
In order to separate consideration of the issue of privacy from that of 
competition, this article begins by assuming that consumers place no limits on 
the use of their information by entities they directly deal with, or “collectors” of 
                                                          
 21 Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different 
Sources, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (July 2, 2019), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs 
/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.html?nn=3591568. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Sara Germano, Facebook Wins Appeal Against German Data-Collection Ban, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wins-appeal-against-
german-data-collection-ban-11566835967 (explaining that the Dusseldorf Higher Regional 
Court rejected the Cartel Office’s findings that Facebook abused its market power to gather 
information from users without their consent). But see Joseph Nasr, German Cartel Office to 
Take Facebook Case to High Court, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-facebook-germany/german-cartel-office-to-take-facebook-case-to-high-court-
idUSKCN1VG1AJ (explaining that the Cartel Office filed an appeal of the Regional Court’s 
decision). 
 27 Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigation into 
Possible Anti-Competitive Conduct of Amazon (July 17, 2019). 
 28 Id. 
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their information, and any entities to which these collectors choose to transfer 
their information.29 Where, by assumption, users have no objections to the 
combining of information about themselves that has been initially obtained by 
different entities, the question remains as to whether the initial collectors will 
choose to cooperate with their rivals by sharing that information and, if not, what 
policies might encourage or facilitate such cooperation. 
If there are large disparities in the amounts of information that are acquired 
by different entities, cooperation in information sharing is unlikely. This is 
because entities with disproportionately large amounts of information have 
relatively little to gain and much to lose from sharing the information that they 
collect. Indeed, by refusing to share information data with their smaller rivals, 
large entities may be able to eliminate these rivals as competitors and instead 
turn them into customers.30 As Crémer et al have observed, “if data that is not 
available to market entrants provides a strong competitive advantage, its 
possession may lead to market dominance…. Any discussion of market power 
should therefore analyse case by case the access to data available to the 
presumed dominant firm but not to competitors, and the sustainability of any 
such differential access to data.”31 The Market Structure and Antitrust 
Subcommittee of the Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms makes the 
same point when it observes that “to maintain or improve their competitive 
advantage, incumbents have strong incentives to limit openness or 
interoperability and to be averse to data-portability policies.”32 Similarly, 
Rubinfeld and Gal note that: 
Data collectors and analyzers have the potential to sell or license their 
data sets to multiple users. Yet legal and technological barriers in all 
parts of the data-value chain may limit data portability.… With or 
without these potential barriers, there are likely to be strong 
economic incentives to maintain control over large data sets and to 
create structural barriers, potentially rendering at least parts of the 
chain noncompetitive.33 
                                                          
 29 See generally Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, 
Consumer Protection, and The Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 134–
36, 56 (2015) (evaluating the risk of combining privacy and competition policies and 
summarizing proposals to protect privacy with competition law). 
 30 See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, COMPETITION WORLD 15-16 (Peter Scott & Susanna 
Rogers, 2d ed. 2017) (explaining that rivals can also be eliminated by acquiring them). 
 31 JACQUES CRÉMER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL 
ERA 4 (2019). 
 32 MKT. STRUCTURE & ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DIG. 
PLATFORMS, STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, REPORT 19 (2019) 
(stating that incumbents may create or maintain systems that make data portability difficult). 
 33 Rubinfeld & Gal, supra note 18, at 373, 343 (discussing the reluctance of firms to 
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Finally, the European Commission recently noted that one of the reasons that 
“data sharing between companies has not taken off at sufficient scale” is the 
“lack of economic incentives (including the fear of losing a competitive 
edge)….”34 The Commission went on to note that it “will explore the need for 
legislative action on issues that affect relations between actors in the data-agile 
economy to provide incentives for horizontal data sharing across sectors 
(complementing data sharing within sectors).”35 
More generally, large firms often have limited incentives to cooperate with 
their smaller rivals, a situation that Joseph Farrell and I have characterized as the 
“Pesky Little Brother” phenomenon.36 Along similar lines, Shapiro and Varian 
have noted that: (1) a network is more valuable if you can control when others 
can interconnect with you;37 (2) accessible technologies are more likely to gain 
popularity and success for innovators that can control the use and design of their 
technology; 38 and (3) an incumbent can attempt to deny access to potential new 
technology entrants by “extending the life of its own technology.”39 Although 
Shelanski has noted that “[n]etwork effects can be shared among rivals if those 
rivals interconnect with each other or in some other way share the source of the 
positive network externality,”40 as Noam has observed in another context, this is 
most unlikely to occur when there is “an asymmetry in bargaining strength and 
in the urgency for interconnection.”41 Rubinfeld and Gal make the same point 
when they observe that “where a firm’s comparative advantage relies on the use 
of a unique data set, and it is best positioned to make efficient use of this data, 
its incentives to limit the transferability of the data will be higher.”42 
The argument that the information that a firm collects about its users should 
not be available for use only by that firm is made forcefully in Unlocking Digital 
Competition.43  Specifically, the Expert Panel that produced the report observed 
                                                          
enable data portability). 
 34 EUROPEAN COMM’N, A EUROPEAN STRATEGY FOR DATA 7 (2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-european-strategy-data-
19feb2020_en.pdf. 
 35 Id. at 13. 
 36 Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and 
Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117, 126-29 (1994). 
 37 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 197 (1998). 
 38 Id. at 225. 
 39 Id. at 235. 
 40 Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the 
Internet, 161 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1684 (2013). 
 41 Eli M. Noam, Interconnection Practices, IN HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ECONOMICS 390 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002). 
 42 Rubinfeld & Gal, supra note 18, at 367. 
 43 DIG. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 6, 9–10, 74–77 
(2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
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that market competition will not fix a digital technology system whose “market 
tipping” nature rewards established companies that have competitive advantages 
because of their large data sets in a “winner-takes-most” scenario.44 The Panel 
went on to recommend the creation of a “digital markets unit [that] would be 
charged with enabling greater personal data mobility and systems with open 
standards [to] … increase competition and consumer choice.”45 It further noted 
that, while some interoperability obstacles exist due to a lack of technical 
development and uniformity in technology, others remain simply because big 
companies benefit from their existence. Although the Panel argues that data 
sharing is essential to promoting competition, it is significant that it would have 
the digital markets unit responsible for protecting privacy as well as promoting 
competition, which might lead to less data sharing.46 
Although a case might be made for compulsory data sharing among 
competitors, because imposing obligations on data collectors to share those data 
with their rivals is likely to be difficult and complicated, competition authorities 
could seek to prevent large disparities in data holdings from developing in the 
first place, most obviously by preventing mergers or deterring acquisitions that 
would lead to that result.47 Where data sharing among competitors exists, or 
where such data sharing is likely to develop, competition authorities could take 
into account the effect of a proposed merger or acquisition on the incentives of 
that form of cooperation to continue or develop.48 That is, even if the immediate 
                                                          
attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf. 
 44 Id. at 9 (“There may be situations where opening up some of the data held by digital 
businesses and providing access on reasonable terms is the essential and justified step 
needed to unlock competition. Any remedy of this kind would need to protect personal 
privacy and consider carefully whether the benefits justified the impact on the business 
holding the data. But the ability to pursue data openness is an essential tool for the unit.”). 
 45 Id. at 5–6; Theresa May, Prime Minister of U.K., Speech Opening London Tech 
Week (June 10, 2019) (explaining that the outgoing Prime Minister Theresa May indicated 
that the U.K. government intends to implement this recommendation). 
 46 See generally Facebook, Inc., In the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3184/facebook-inc (last updated 
July 24, 2019) (discussing recent examples of actions taken by regulators to deal with 
privacy issues including the FTC’s $5 billion judgement against Facebook); The CNIL’s 
Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 Million Euros Against GOOGLE 
LLC, CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-
financial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc. 
 47 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. 
July 24, 2019); The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 Million 
Euros Against GOOGLE LLC, CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-
committee-imposes-financial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc (providing recent 
examples of actions taken by regulators to deal with privacy issues). 
 48 Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1129, 1145–46 (2016). 
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effect of a proposed merger on competition may appear to be benign, the merger 
could be challenged if its indirect effect is to reduce substantially the incentives 
of the merged entity to share data with its rivals and thus to increase 
concentration among suppliers significantly.49 Of course, there should be a 
reasonable expectation that this would be the case. 
In an analogous situation in the 1990s, a small number of “top-level” internet 
backbones competed to deliver traffic from and to Internet Service Providers 
(“ISPs”) (a service known as transit), and cooperated by exchanging, at no 
charge, the traffic that originated at the ISP customers on one of the backbones 
that was destined to be delivered to the ISP customers of another of the 
backbones (a service known as peering).50 When MCI and WorldCom, each of 
which operated one of the top-level backbones proposed to merge, they were 
required to divest one of the backbones. This preserved the rough symmetry 
among backbones that had previously existed, thus leaving their incentives to 
exchange internet traffic unaffected.51 
As DOJ official Constance Robinson explained: 
Prior to the MCI/WorldCom merger, no single backbone provider 
reached a disproportionate amount of destinations on the Internet 
relative to other major players. There was a rough equality, with each 
backbone provider depending on the other. Each backbone provider, 
therefore, had an incentive to support efficient interconnections 
because its failure to do so would have caused such a degradation of 
quality that it risked losing customers to the other networks. That 
incentive would change, however, if the two largest backbone 
providers were combined…. By giving MCI/WorldCom a 
disproportionately large customer base, the merger would have 
changed MCI/WorldCom’s incentives from favoring compatibility 
toward favoring incompatibility.52 
By analogy, in deciding whether to approve a proposed merger of firms for 
which access to data provides a significant competitive advantage, a competition 
authority should analyze the effect of the merger on the incentives of the merging 
parties to share data with others. Where the evidence indicates that their 
incentives to do so would be adversely affected to a significant degree, the 
                                                          
 49 Id. at 1157–58. 
 50 See Stanley M. Besen & Mark A. Israel, The Evolution of Internet Interconnection 
from Hierarchy to “Mesh”: Implications for Government Regulation, 25 INFO. ECON. & 
POL’Y 235, 235 (2013). 
 51 See generally Constance K. Robinson, Director of Operations and Merger Enf’t, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Division, Address at the Practicing Law Institute: Network Effects 
in Telecommunications Mergers – MCI WorldCom Merger: Protecting the Future of the 
Internet (Aug. 23, 1999). 
 52 Id. 
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merger might not be approved.53 Such a “structural” approach would clearly be 
preferable to employing “behavioral” remedies, for example, by allowing the 
merger and then requiring the “dominant” platform to make available the data 
that it collects to its smaller rivals.54 Following the same reasoning, the 
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission has recommended that the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Act of 2010 be amended to include, as a 
factor in analyzing the effects of a merger, “the nature and significance of assets, 
including data and technology, being acquired directly or through the body 
corporate.”55 
Along the same lines, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) recently 
“issued Special Orders to five large technology firms, requiring them to provide 
information about prior acquisitions not reported to the antitrust agencies under 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act.”56 In their statement accompanying the 
FTC’s announcement, Commissioners Wilson and Chopra stated that the FTC 
should: 
Prioritize … studies that explore consumer protection issues arising 
from the privacy and data security practices of technology 
companies, including social media platforms. In particular, we 
                                                          
 53 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reviewing the Practices of 
Market-Leading Online Platforms (July 23, 2019) (discussing how the same logic applies to 
the analysis of exclusive contracts for the use of data because, as in mergers, a firm that 
acquires exclusive control over very large amounts of data through contract may have only 
limited incentives to enter data sharing arrangements with its competitors. The United States 
Department of Justice recently announced that “the Department’s Antitrust Division is 
reviewing whether and how market-leading online platforms have achieved market power 
and are engaging in practices that have reduced competition, stifled innovation, or otherwise 
harmed consumers.”); Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Antitrust Div., Address at Harvard Law School: “Blind[ing] Me with Science”*: Antitrust, 
Data, and Digital Markets (Nov. 8. 2019) (“The Antitrust Division is studying the ways 
market power can manifest itself in industries where data plays a key role.”). 
 54 Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Data Accumulation and the Privacy-
Antitrust Interface: Insights from the Facebook Case for the EU and U.S. 8–9, 34 
(Transatlantic Tech. Law Forum, Working Paper No. 31, 2018) (explaining that this 
approach would be employed by a “competition-only” agency that would not need to 
interject privacy considerations into its analysis. Also noting that while the 
Bundeskartellamt “also applies data protection principles” in the Facebook matter, 
“Facebook’s practice of forcing users to choose between accepting the whole Facebook 
package or not using Facebook at all indicates that Facebook is imposing unfair conditions 
and/or foreclosing rivals, with the ultimate effect of impairing competition in the advertising 
market.”). 
 55 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY 105 
(2019). 
 56 FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large Technology Companies, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-
examine-past-acquisitions-large-technology-companies. 
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encourage the FTC to study whether and, if so, how content curation 
and targeted advertising practices impact data collection, use, and 
sharing, and how the monetization of data impacts the creation and 
refinement of algorithms that drive content curation and targeted 
advertising practices.57 
As an alternative to blocking a merger that would consolidate the data 
holdings of the merging firms, a competition authority might require, as a 
condition for its approval, that existing data sharing arrangements be preserved. 
For example, the proposed acquisition by Google of ITA Software, the operator 
of an airline pricing and shopping system that provided “ongoing access to seat 
and fare class availability data,” raised the issue of whether Google would 
continue to provide access to the system to its search engine rivals.58 To assure 
that this would be the case, as a condition of approving the merger, the DOJ 
required Google to commit to honoring existing licenses, to renew existing 
licenses under similar terms, and to offer new licensees on fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory terms.59 
Similarly, in connection with the proposed acquisition of DataQuick 
Information Systems, Inc. by CoreLogic, Inc., “[t]o preserve competition that 
would be lost due to the acquisition,” the FTC required CoreLogic “to license to 
Renwood Realty Trac (“RealtyTrac”) national assessor and recorder bulk data 
as well as several ancillary data sets that DataQuick provides to its customers.” 
The FTC argued that the order “allow[ed] RealtyTrac to offer customers the data 
and services that DataQuick offer[ed] and to become an effective competitor in 
the market.”60 
Finally, in connection with the proposed acquisition by Cox Enterprise, Inc. 
of Dealertrack Technologies, Inc., the DOJ not only required Cox to divest 
Dealertrack’s automobile dealership full-featured inventory management 
solution (“IMS”), it also required Cox to “enable the continuing exchange of 
data and content between the divested IMS business and other data sources, 
internet sites and automotive solutions that Cox will control.”61 The DOJ also 
                                                          
 57 Statement of Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, joined by Rohit 
Chopra, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Concerning Non-Reportable Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
Filing 6(b) Orders (Feb. 11, 2020), reports-technology-platform-companies/ 
statement_by_commissioners_wilson_and_chopra_re_hsr_6b_0.pdf. 
 58 Brian J. Smith, Vertical vs. Core Search: Defining Google’s Market in a 
Monopolization Case, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 331, 333, 342 (2012). 
 59 Competitive Impact Statement at 2–3, United States v. Google Inc., No. 11CV00688 
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), 2011 WL 2444825. 
 60 See FTC Puts Conditions on CoreLogic, Inc.’s Proposed Acquisition of DataQuick 
Information Systems, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2014/03/ftc-puts-conditions-corelogic-incs-proposed-acquisition-
dataquick. 
 61 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Cox Automotive to 
76 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 28.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
required Cox to “undertake various obligations to prevent Cox from using 
Dealertrack’s interest in Chrome Data Solutions LP, a company that compiles 
and licenses vehicle information data for use in inventory systems and other 
automated solutions and services for the automotive industry.”62 
Interestingly, one of the reasons given by the FTC for closing its earlier 
investigation of Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick was that “the 
evidence [did] not support the conclusion that the aggregation of consumer or 
competitive information accessible to Google as a result of its acquisition of 
DoubleClick [was] likely to confer market power.”63 Specifically, the FTC 
stated that “the evidence indicate[d] that neither the data available to Google, 
nor the data available to DoubleClick, constitute[d] an essential input to a 
successful advertising product. A number of Google’s competitors have at their 
disposal valuable stores of data not available to Google.”64 However, in her 
dissenting statement, Commissioner Harbour noted that: 
Marrying the [Google and DoubleClick] datasets raises long-term 
competition questions that beg further inquiry [:] In a post-merger 
online advertising market driven by the value of behavioral targeting, 
will Google/DoubleClick face meaningful competition? Will any 
other firm be able to amass a dataset of the same scope and size? Will 
any other company be able to overcome network effects and offer an 
equally focused level of behavioral targeting? If advertisers and 
publishers have to channel their online advertising through 
Google/DoubleClick in order to access the best dataset that supports 
targeted advertising, will any other firms have the ability or incentive 
to compete meaningfully in this market?65 
Significantly, she concluded that “[i]n the future, the Commission likely will 
issue Second Requests in other merger investigations that implicate 
combinations of data as well as potentially overlapping products and services. 
When those deals arise, the Commission should ensure that the combinations of 
data are included squarely within the scope of Second Requests.”66 
Finally, a competition authority could analyze whether any claimed 
efficiencies from combining the data of the merging parties could be achieved 
by other means. Crémer et al note that claims of efficiencies from a merger 
                                                          
Divest Inventory Management Solution in Order to Complete Acquisition of Dealertrack 
(Sept. 29, 2015). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
Concerning Google/DoubleClick (Dec. 20, 2007). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela 
Jones Harbour In the Matter of Google/DoubleClick, at 8 (Dec. 20, 2007). 
 66 Id. at 9. 
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“would not be considered merger-specific if … they would be achievable also 
via non-exclusive access or interoperability agreements.”67 That is, a 
competition authority could reject the argument that a merger is needed to create 
a larger database if the benefits from doing so could be obtained through data 
sharing across platforms.68 
IV. SHOULD DATA SHARING BE MADE COMPULSORY? 
Unless specifically prevented from doing so, a firm that initially collects data 
about an individual can use those data to either lower its costs or increase the 
demand for its products or services.69 Whether that firm will or should make 
those data available to other firms, and on what terms, is, of course, a different 
question. 
If access to a very large amount of data created efficiencies that firms could 
not otherwise achieve, if control of those data by a single firm threatened 
competition, and if competition were the only concern, firms could be required 
to share the data that they acquire from their users with other firms.70 In addition, 
as suggested by the Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee of the 
Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms, a “[Digital Authority] could set 
up rules that allow users to easily port their data from one service to another and 
monitor compliance.”71 Although mandating data sharing is obviously less 
attractive than maintaining a situation in which firms have incentives to 
exchange data voluntarily, there may be situations in which compulsory data 
sharing is the only feasible alternative. 
It is useful to begin the discussion of compulsory data sharing by exploring 
                                                          
 67 JACQUES CRÉMER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL 
ERA 123 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf. 
 68 Dana Mattioli, Amazon’s Deal Making Threatened by D.C. Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. 
(July 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-deal-making-threatened-by-d-c-
scrutiny-11562146205?mod=hp_lead_pos2 (noting that a number of acquisitions by 
Amazon appear to be motivated not “with an eye toward cutting costs by combining jobs 
and functions,” but rather “are designed to build out certain areas and harness new data”) 
(emphasis added). 
 69 Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN (Aug. 
23, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/index.html. 
 70 Alexei Alexis, Big Tech’s Data Control Faces Antitrust Scrutiny at FTC, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/big-
techs-data-control-faces-antitrust-scrutiny-at-ftc. 
 71 MKT. STRUCTURE & ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DIG. 
PLATFORMS, STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, REPORT 9, 88 (2019) 
(“Congress should consider creating a specialist regulator, the Digital Authority. The 
regulator could be tasked with creating general conditions conducive to competition.” 
According to the Subcommittee, the Data Authority “could also set up a process by which a 
customer can choose to send her data to an entrant by authorizing it to be transferred directly 
from her former service provider.”). 
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an analogous situation drawn from another context: carrier interconnection in 
the telecommunications industry. As Noam has noted: 
The historic experience with interconnection around the world shows 
that interconnection is not made available freely by an incumbent to 
its competitors.  Nor is the claim to interconnection as a right given 
up voluntarily by new entrants once competition emerges…. Often, 
the terms of interconnection are left nominally or initially to the 
parties’ negotiation. Yet regulatory intervention is frequent where 
there is an asymmetry in bargaining strength and in the urgency for 
interconnection, which is usually the case. Even where formal 
regulatory intervention does not take place, the negotiations are 
shaped by the expectations of what the regulator’s decisions would 
be. Those decisions, in turn, depend on fundamental policy priorities. 
As a matter of empirical fact, interconnection is regulated 
everywhere where competitive telecommunications exist.72 
The point here is that, just as interconnecting with their smaller competitors 
is likely to erode the competitive advantage of large telecommunications 
carriers, so that those carriers are unlikely to be willing to interconnect unless 
compelled to do so by regulators, firms with large amounts of data are also likely 
to be unwilling to share their data with their smaller competitors.73 In the present 
context, Crémer et al note that “[w]hen the platform is part of an ecosystem, the 
lack of interoperability with other services of the same ecosystem and the 
absence or limited access to historical and future ecosystem data will make it 
difficult for a new entrant to compete on the merit of the specific service and/or 
algorithm.”74 Furthermore, Prüfer and Schottmüller explain that “data sharing 
(voluntary, or not) eliminates the mechanism causing data-driven markets to tip. 
With mandatory data sharing, both competitors face the same cost function; a 
firm with initially higher demand does not have a cost advantage in producing 
quality.”75 Finally, Rubinfeld and Gal argue that “[i]f the source of the barriers 
[to data sharing] is inherently structural, and sharing the data is socially 
beneficial, a regulatory solution may be appropriate, perhaps by requirements 
that the data be made widely available at a reasonable and non-discriminatory 
cost.”76 
                                                          
 72 Eli M. Noam, Interconnection Practices, IN HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ECONOMICS 389–90 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002). 
 73 Id. (“Interconnection is voluntarily initiated by collaborating and non-competing 
carriers, such as those of different countries.”). 
 74 CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 67 at 36. 
 75 Jens Prüfer & Christoph Schottmüller, Competing with Big Data 3 (Tilburg Law & 
Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2017-006, 2017). 
 76 Rubinfeld & Gal, supra note 18, at 373. 
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There are various types of interoperability but the one that is of interest here 
is what Crémer et al refer to as “data interoperability,” which they define as 
“roughly equivalent to data portability but with a continuous, potentially real-
time, access to personal or machine user data.”77 They go on to note that 
“[e]xisting data interoperability mechanisms typically rely on privileged APIs 
[(Application Programming Interfaces)], which provide to a service B the means 
to access its users’ data through a service A’s API, if the users have given 
authorisation for this transfer of data.”78 
As the experience in mandating interconnection in telecommunications makes 
clear, mandating data sharing is unlikely to be straightforward. Although the 
necessary cooperation among telecommunications firms is limited to completing 
calls that originate on the networks of other operators, disputes can nevertheless 
arise regarding, among other things: (1) the locations at which interconnection 
takes place; (2) the quality of interconnection; and (3) the prices charged for 
interconnection.79 The necessary conditions for the efficient sharing of data are 
likely to be at least as complex.80 Which data would be shared, at what 
frequency, and at what level of aggregation, as well as the technical standards 
through which data sharing would take place and the prices, if any, that would 
be charged by the initial collectors, are among the issues that would have to be 
addressed in any mandatory data sharing regime.81 That is why, if feasible, a 
better solution would be to seek to promote or maintain a market structure in 
which firms have an economic incentive to share data voluntarily. 
Finally, Crémer et al suggest that the recent Facebook decision by the 
Bundeskartellamt “might require consumers to provide consent to data 
processing by specific services of a dominant firm, which may help to 
counterbalance the self-reinforcement of dominance by way of preferential data 
                                                          
 77 CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 67, at 58. 
 78 Id. at 58–59. 
 79 WORLD BANK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION HANDBOOK, MODULE 3: 
INTERCONNECTION 4 (Hank Intven & McCarthy Tétrault, 2000) (explaining that under 
“Some Key Interconnection Issues” it lists, among Framework and Procedural Issues: 
“Access to standard interconnection terms with incumbent operator,” “Independent and 
timely dispute resolution,” and “Non-discriminatory access to interconnection facilities and 
services”; among Commercial Issues: “Level and structure of interconnection charges,” 
“Unbundling of interconnection charges for different network components and related 
services,” and “Payment for network modifications to facilitate interconnection”; and 
among Technical and Operational Issues: “Location of Points of Interconnection,” 
“Collocation and sharing of infrastructure (e.g., buildings, poles, conduits, ducts, towers),” 
and “Quality of interconnection, including availability of sufficient interconnection capacity 
to avoid congestion, and to ensure the timely provisioning of interconnection services and 
facilities”). 
 80 See IAN OPPERMANN ET AL., DATA SHARING FRAMEWORKS: TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER 
7 (ACS 2017). 
 81 See id. at 21. 
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access.”82 They go on to observe that: 
In some settings, we can expect the foreclosure effects from a refusal 
to grant access to data to be high, in particular if a high degree of 
market concentration translates into a high degree of data 
concentration, and if that data yields an important competitive 
advantage in serving neighbouring markets. In such a setting, the 
need to ensure the possibility of entry may argue in favour of 
mandating access to data.83 
V. PROMOTING PRIVACY AS THE SOLE POLICY OBJECTIVE 
Just as the previous discussion considered how an agency tasked solely with 
dealing with the link between data sharing and competition might behave, this 
section considers how a “privacy-only” agency might deal with the link between 
data sharing and privacy. This agency would deal with: (1) which data could be 
shared; (2) with whom the data could be shared; and (3) who would decide these 
issues. 
It is useful to begin by specifying the range of policies that might be adopted 
to deal with the issue of privacy.84 These include the following: 
1. An entity may not use the data that it collects about its users.85 
2. An entity may use the data that it collects about a user only if the user 
explicitly grants it permission to do so.86 
                                                          
 82 CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 67, at 80. 
 83 Id. at 99. 
 84 Compare Andres V. Lerner, The Role of “Big Data” In Online Platform Competition, 
SSRN, Aug. 2014, at 1, 18–19 (claiming that concerns about privacy may be overstated 
because “competition compels online providers to achieve an efficient balance between the 
consumer benefits from collecting user data with users’ demand for privacy…. [M]ost 
reputable online providers will bear a significant cost in terms of reduced demand if they 
overstep user privacy norms. This is especially true for ad-supported online businesses, 
which are dependent on attracting users in order to monetize through the sale of 
advertising.”, with Warwick Ashford, Many Search Engine Users Unaware of Personal 
Data Collection, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252464048/Many-search-engine-users-unaware-of-
personal-data-collection (asserting that Lerner’s claim is overstated). 
 85 See Overview of Privacy Policies, CLARIP, https://www.clarip.com/data-
privacy/privacy-policy-overview/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (showing that in addition to the 
differences enumerated here, privacy policies may differ according to the categories of 
information collected, the business or commercial purpose for collecting or selling the 
information, and the categories of third parties with whom the business shares the 
information, as well as whether the policies apply to all firms or only those above a given 
size). 
 86 See April Lea Pope, To Behave or Not to Behave: How Behavioral Science Can 
Inform Policy and the Law, THE ADVOC., Mar.–Apr. 2016, at 41, 42. 
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3. An entity may use the data that it collects about a user, but it may not share 
those data with any other entity unless the user explicitly grants it permission to 
do so.87 
4. An entity may share the data that it collects about a user with any other entity 
unless the user explicitly objects to such sharing.88 
5. An entity must share the data that it collects about a user with other entities if 
the user requests that it does so.89 
At one extreme, a policy with the sole objective of protecting user privacy 
could preclude a firm from making any use of the data that it collects from its 
users. A possible defense of this position is that consumers are incapable of 
                                                          
 87 See NAI Establishes Detailed Requirements for Obtaining Opt-in Consent In 
Consumer Apps, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.networkadvertising.org/sites/default/files/draft_opt-in_guidance_release.pdf 
(showing how the Network Advertising Initiative, which describes itself as “the leading 
self-regulatory association dedicated to responsible data collection and its use for digital 
advertising companies,” recently released a guidance document that describes the “clear and 
conspicuous detailed notice that is required before a member … obtains Opt-In Consent” 
that clarifies “that the [user] data will be shared with third parties for advertising purposes”); 
see also NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, GUIDANCE FOR NAI MEMBERS: OPT-IN CONSENT 
(2019), https://www.networkadvertising.org/sites/default/files/final_nai_optinconsent-
guidance19_final.pdf; Buckley LLP, New York Considers Privacy Legislation Broader than 
the CCPA, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/r.ashx?l=8P2VDMM 
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York state is considering legislation that would require documented consent from a 
consumer in order for data to be transferred to a third party); Sara Germano, Facebook Wins 
Appeal Against German Data-Collection Ban, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wins-appeal-against-german-data-collection-ban-
11566835967 (detailing how under a decision by the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf, 
user consent is required for Facebook to combine data from different Facebook-owned 
services as well as to assign data collected from third party websites to a Facebook user 
account); CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 67, at 36 (stating that even if some users were to grant 
permission for the collection of data to be shared with other entities, the entity that receives 
the shared data might still be at a competitive disadvantage if many users chose not to 
permit sharing. For example, “the quality of [an] algorithm is a (non-linear) function of the 
amount of data (say number of users)…. Even if users could choose to have their data 
entirely ported, a new service would need to convince enough of them to have enough data 
transferred to develop quality algorithms.”). 
 88 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a) (2018) (explaining how the California Consumer 
Privacy Act provides that “[a] consumer shall have the right, at any time, to direct a business 
that sells personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell the consumer’s 
personal information. This right may be referred to as the right to opt out.”); see IAB 
PRIVACY, IAB CCPA COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLISHERS & TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANIES 4 (2019), https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/IAB_CCPA-
Compliance-Framework-for-Publishers-Technology-Companies.pdf (stating that the 
recently issued IAB CCPA Compliance Framework would require participating publishers 
to include a link on their digital properties which would allow users to prevent their personal 
information from being sold). 
 89 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a) (2018); GUIDANCE FOR NAI MEMBERS: OPT-IN 
CONSENT, supra note 87. 
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making informed judgments about whether the costs of allowing the use of their 
data by the firm that collects it exceed the benefits.90 Given the numerous and 
complex ways in which such data might be used, this is not an unreasonable 
position. Nevertheless, this policy is unlikely to be adopted anytime soon, 
perhaps because of a judgment that, for most consumers, the benefits of allowing 
their data to be used would exceed the costs. 
A less extreme position would be to limit the use of a user’s data to the firm 
that collects it, so long as the user “opts in,” that is, that the user affirmatively 
states that the collecting firm can use the data.91 Whether the decision to do so 
is an informed one will depend in part on the information provided to consumers 
about the likely use of their data. In 2007, the FTC proposed that an entity that 
wishes to make use of the data provide a “consumer-friendly, and prominent 
statement that data is being collected to provide ads targeted to the consumer.”92 
In 2014, the FTC recommended that Congress consider requiring entities that 
collect data from consumers to inform consumers that their data may be shared 
with data brokers, “companies whose primary business is collecting personal 
information about consumers from a variety of sources and aggregating, 
analyzing, and sharing that information, or information derived from it,” and to 
provide consumers with the ability to opt-out of having their information 
shared.93 
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online, for example,” the Staff proposed that “companies should only collect sensitive data 
for behavioral advertising if they obtain affirmative express consent from the consumer to 
receive such advertising.”); see also Anne Cullen, Sen. Floats Making National ‘Do Not 
Track’ List for User Data, L. 360 (May 21, 2019), https://www.law360.com/telecom/ 
articles/1161403/sen-floats-making-national-do-not-track-list-for-user-data?nl_pk= 
340c08d5-097a-42a7-ba72-38a91a46c280&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email 
&utm_campaign=telecom (explaining that a recent bill seeks to make compulsory the 
voluntary approach earlier proposed by the FTC, and that the bill would allow consumers 
that enrolled in a “national registry” to prevent, among other things, a company that collects 
a consumer’s data from sharing those data with other companies). 
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Another position, which could contain elements of the “opt in” view, would 
allow the entity that collects the data to make use of the data but would preclude 
the entity from sharing it.94 An example of this position is contained in the 
decision by the German Federal Cartel Office that is discussed above, which 
seeks to prevent data sharing among different Facebook entities.95 Since those 
entities are not likely to be competitors with one another, the principal objective 
of this policy appears to be to limit the amount of data about an individual that 
can be acquired by a single entity, which would seem to reflect a concern about 
privacy. 
Still another position, which is also reflected in the decision of the 
Bundeskartellamt, is to allow sharing of data among entities so long as users 
have given their permission to do so.96  This position, elements of which are also 
contained in the decision of the German Federal Cartel Office, is to allow some 
sharing of the data between entities if a user “opts in” but to preclude other uses, 
as in the limits that the Bundeskartellamt has proposed on data sharing among 
different Facebook entities.97 
Finally, I note that, under the terms of the European Union Directive on 
Payment Services (“PSD2”), “traditional payment service providers will need to 
share certain data with … third-party providers to access payment accounts 
(e.g., current accounts) and statement details, as well as other account 
information held by banks and other account-servicing payment service 
                                                          
ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-
brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf. 
 94 Kerry Myers et al., New Laws Bring Much Tougher Data Protections, J. OF 
ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 2019. 
 95 Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different 
Sources, supra note 21. 
 96 Council Directive 2015/2366, art. 46, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 1, 17 (EU) (stating that banks 
are required to give Third Party Providers access to a customer’s payment account data if 
the customer explicitly consents to such disclosure, which is intended to improve 
competition and innovation in the EU market for payment services). 
 97 Dotan Hammer, United States: New State Laws In the U.S. Aimed at Strengthening 
Consumer Privacy and Data Security, MONDAQ (July 10, 2019), https://www.mondaq.com/ 
unitedstates/Privacy/823302/New-State-Laws-In-The-US-Aimed-At-Strengthening-
Consumer-Privacy-And-Data-Security (stating that a number of states have adopted or 
proposed legislation that would increase the control that individuals have over the manner in 
which their personal data can be used, specifically, whether, and the manner in which, 
transfers of personal data would require their consent. For example, Maine has adopted 
legislation that prohibits a provider of broadband internet access from “using, disclosing, 
selling or permitting access to customer personal information unless the customer expressly 
consents to that use, disclosure, sale or access.”); James R. Carroll et al., Nevada Enacts 
Right to Opt Out of Sale of Information, SKADDEN PRIVACY & CYBERSECURITY UPDATE, 
June 2019, at 1, 5 (stating Nevada has adopted a law that requires “operators” to establish a 
mechanism through which consumers can make a “verified request” that their covered 
information not be sold). 
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providers (“ASPSPs”) where customers consent to such access.”98 According to 
the European Union, “the PSD2 opens the EU payment market for companies 
offering consumer or business-oriented payment services based on the access to 
the information from the payment account – so called ‘payment initiation 
services providers’ and ‘account information services providers.’ “99 
Significantly, the PSD2 requires entities to share user data with their competitors 
so long as users have granted them permission to do so.100 
What is interesting about PSD2 is that it appears to take consumers’ desire for 
privacy directly into account because information sharing is only possible if a 
consumer affirmatively consents to allow his data to be shared.101 At the same 
time, the consumer would clearly be making a tradeoff between competition and 
privacy because he presumably would allow his data to be shared only if doing 
so promoted competition for his patronage.102 The question remains, however, 
whether the approach has more widespread applicability. 
VI. CLASSIFYING DATA 
One reason that structural approaches (ones that rely on the incentives of firms 
to engage in data exchanges) are likely to be superior to behavioral approaches 
(those that mandate data exchanges) is that it will be difficult to decide which 
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 100 DIG. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 9 (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
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single service and to apply their data sharing preferences across platforms, like with Open 
Banking, a UK initiative in which “at the consumer’s request, firms share specified account 
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 101 See id. (explaining that consent is necessary for collecting and processing personal 
data). 
 102 See generally Santanen, supra note 3, at 9, 14 (noting that new technologies are being 
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advances in technology as firms compete for their patronage but at the expense of consumer 
privacy). 
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data will be mandated to be exchanged. Crémer et al define “volunteered data” 
as data intentionally contributed by the user of a product, “observed data” as data 
obtained automatically from a user’s or a machine’s activity, and “inferred data” 
as data obtained by transforming in a non-trivial manner volunteered and/or 
observed data.103 They go on to observe that: 
Where firms or individuals are willing to volunteer very simple data 
such as name or e-mails, they will frequently be ready to volunteer it 
repeatedly. Inferred data has undergone a process of refinement. 
Normally, there will not be a duty to share such results and insights 
with competitors. Frequently, access requests will therefore zero in 
on observed data, which often cannot be replicated, and volunteered 
data that would take a significant amount of effort to volunteer again 
(e.g. calendar data).104 
They also point out that data can be collected and used in different forms 
including individual-level data (e.g. data from a specific user or a machine), 
bundled individual-level data used anonymously (e.g. movie preferences used 
for collaborative filtering, aggregated-level data, and profit & loss information), 
and contextual data (e.g. maps information). Moreover, information can be 
generated at different frequencies, and data access can either concern historical 
or real-time data.105 Data can be personal or non-personal.106 Furthermore, as the 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) notes, “[data] can . . . be 
requested and used for many different reasons (e.g. to provide complementary 
services to a product or service provided by a dominant firm, or for the purpose 
of training algorithms including for uses that are completely unrelated to the 
fields of activity of the data controller).”107 
Finally, Rubinfeld and Gal identify what they call the “four primary 
characteristics of big data – volume, velocity, variety, and veracity.”108 Volume 
refers to whether data “can only be analyzed through the establishment of a 
unique platform that can manage substantial volumes of information in a 
                                                          
 103 See CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 67, at 24–25 (discussing the distinctions between 
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 104 See id. at 101. 
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reasonable timeframe,” velocity refers to the “freshness” of the data, variety 
reflects “the number of different sources from which the data are gathered,” and 
veracity refers to the “truthfulness” of the data.109 Some of these characteristics 
appear to be orthogonal to the classifications used by Crémer et al, for example, 
observed data may or may not be “fresh” or “truthful” but, on the other hand, 
“velocity” appears to be related to Crémer et al’s distinction between real time 
and historical data.110 
VII. CAN COMPETITION AND PRIVACY CONCERNS BE 
RECONCILED? 
Since the treatment of individual data raises both competition and privacy 
concerns, the question naturally arises as to how to reconcile those concerns. For 
example, a “competition-only” agency might conclude that competition is best 
served by unfettered, or even compulsory, data sharing, whereas an agency 
tasked only with protecting consumer privacy might take a different view.111 
Here, I address the issue of how competition-only and privacy-only agencies 
might interact.112 
Suppose, for example, that one of the agencies, say the competition-only 
agency, establishes a policy and the other agency, here the one tasked with 
privacy concerns, takes that policy as given and establishes its own policy. If, 
based on the policy adopted by the privacy agency, the competition agency does 
not wish to change its policy, the situation would be an equilibrium in that 
neither agency would wish to alter its behavior.113 Of course, that need not be 
the case. Suppose, for example, that in response to the policy of the competition 
agency, the privacy agency adopted a highly stringent policy, one that made it 
easy for individuals to “opt out” of having their data shared.114 Because that 
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policy would presumably reduce the number of individuals whose data was 
being shared between firms voluntarily, the competition agency might decide, 
in response, to change its policy. For example, it might adopt a more 
“aggressive” policy, one that placed significant limitations on the ability of 
initial data collectors to merge so that voluntary data sharing would be more 
likely. That, in turn, might cause the privacy agency to adopt an even more 
stringent policy, and so on. This might result in an equilibrium but, of course, 
that is not guaranteed.115 An alternative, of course, is for a single agency to be 
tasked with addressing both competition and privacy concerns, although that 
would not be a simple task.116 
VIII. DOES THE PSD2 APPROACH HAVE WIDER APPLICABILITY? 
What is intriguing about the PSD2 approach, in which a consumer can 
affirmatively direct the initial collector of his data to share those data with other 
entities, is that each individual could presumably trade-off his desire for privacy 
against the additional competition for his patronage that foregoing some privacy 
would produce.117 That is, he would forego privacy only to the extent that the 
resulting “loss” was smaller than the “gain” from lower prices and/or improved 
product variety.118 The question is whether that approach has wider applicability, 
that is, whether it could be applied in circumstances other than ones in which a 
consumer can decide whether his financial information can be shared and can 
direct the “collector,” for example his bank, to do so. 
For many of the same reasons that mandating data sharing would be difficult, 
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applying the PSD2 approach more widely is likely to be less than 
straightforward. Specifically, determining which data would be shared, at what 
frequency, at what level of aggregation, and at what cost to the recipients are 
likely to be contentious issues, even after setting aside how they interact with 
privacy concerns.119 Probably the best that can be hoped for in the near term is 
the establishment of minimum standards for each of these dimensions of data 
sharing. In doing so, it would be wise to follow Crémer et al’s suggestion to 
focus on “observed data, which often cannot be replicated, and volunteered data 
that would take a significant amount of effort to volunteer again (e.g. calendar 
data).”120 
IX. CONCLUSION 
It should be clear from the previous discussion that developing policies 
regarding the treatment of data, from either a competition or a privacy 
perspective, let alone from both of them combined, will not be an easy task. 
Nevertheless, one can draw three lessons from the analysis. First, if possible, 
preventing large disparities in data holdings from developing through mergers 
or exclusive contracts is the preferred policy. Just as competition in internet 
interconnection was maintained by the requirement that, as a condition of their 
merger, MCI and WorldCom were required to divest one of their top-level 
backbones, competition authorities should analyze the effects of proposed 
acquisitions or exclusive contracts on concentration in data holdings.  Second, 
where feasible, consumers should be given the choice of which of their data may 
be shared by the initial collector and, indeed, there may be situations in which 
consumers should be able to require the initial collector to share their data with 
others, as in the case of PSD2. Finally, there may be situations in which the 
competitive significance of disparate data holdings is so great that compulsory 
data sharing may be the appropriate policy, although that is likely to be a difficult 
policy to undertake. 
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